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Introduction 
 The Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPS), part of the 
Uruguay Round of trade negotiations led to the creation of the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
in 1995, has led to a variety of interpretations and opinions. Though its application goes beyond 
matters of public health, it is this area that has come under the most scrutiny in the last fifteen 
years as the gaps between developed and developing countries have widened and exposed the 
health disparities between the two groups. Tensions over intellectual property and access to 
newly developed medicines to treat diseases such as HIV and AIDS grew throughout the late 
1990s and culminated in the 2001 Doha Declaration on Public Health.
1
 While intellectual 
property would normally be left to the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), 
developed and developing countries had difficulty agreeing on compulsory licenses during 
negotiations in the 1980s and early 1990s, and as a result the matter went to the WTO instead.
2
 
One of the most controversial aspects of intellectual property has been access to medicines 
treating HIV and AIDS. The number of those receiving anti-retroviral (ARV) treatment has 
grown tremendously, which raises the question of the role the TRIPS Agreement and the Doha 
Declaration on Public Health have played. One cannot attribute success entirely to the TRIPS 
Agreement but at the same time one cannot deny its impact. This paper will provide an overview 
of the policies and explain how if nothing else, the power to issue compulsory licenses has aided 





                                                 
1
 Reichman, Jerome H. "Comment: Compulsory Licensing of Patented Pharmaceutical Inventions: Evaluating the 
Options." Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics 37.2 (2009): 247-263. Academic Search Premier. EBSCO. Web. 
[Accessed 29 Mar. 2010]. 247-8 
2
 Ibid 
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The Beginning, a Very Good Place to Start: The TRIPS Agreement 
 
As stated in the introduction, TRIPS began as one of the original components of the 
World Trade Organization (WTO) upon its founding in 1994 following the Uruguay Round of 
Trade Negotiations. It is little wonder that the Treaty has been the subject of so much discourse 
and controversy as it placed intellectual property in the realm of commercial trade negotiations. 
The TRIPS Agreement has never been limited to pharmaceutical products, however it became 
apparent in the eponymous Doha round of trade negotiations begun in 2001 that pharmaceutical 
patents were a unique aspect of intellectual property because of the obvious implications on 
access to medicines.  
 
Reasons for the 2001 Doha Declaration and the 2003 General Statement on Implementation 
of Paragraph 6 
While scholars analyzing access to medicines often cite the TRIPS agreement, they 
usually mean to refer not to the original treaty but to the Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public 
Health, agreed on in 2001 and implemented in 2003. This key item was nothing more than a 
clarification of the previously agreed upon treaty.
3
 This measure was necessary, however, 
because many countries and companies disagreed about the impact of the Treaty’s provisions on 
the trade of pharmaceutical products and public health emergencies. Despite voting on the 
agreement in 2001, many refused to believe that TRIPS allowed flexibilities.
4
 TRIPS 
Flexibilities can be understood as the safeguards in place that “limit the rights of patent holders” 
                                                 
3
 Sirmalya Nyam. Programme Officer, Innovation and Access to Knowledge at South Centre. Personal interview. 23 
March 2010. 
4
 Lecture on TRIPS at Global Health Course at the Graduate Institute in Geneva. 14 April 2010. 
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so that WTO member countries can provide necessary medications to their people.
5
 The original 
language implied flexibilities were available, however even those who knew this was true felt 
that a clarification was necessary and that it needed to be adopted by the entire WTO.
6
   
The lack of clarity became apparent in the case of South Africa. South Africa, which has 
the largest number of people living with HIV/ADIS, purchased patented HIV/AIDS medicines in 
India because it was less expensive than purchasing them in South Africa, a concept known as 
parallel imports and a crucial element of the TRIPS Agreement.
7
 In 1998, thirty-nine 
pharmaceutical companies sued in South African courts saying that the parallel imports were 
illegal under the TRIPS agreement when in the fact the exact opposite was true.
8
 Undoubtedly 
influenced by the ever-present AIDS crisis, the African member governments of the WTO, 
referred to as the African Group, suggested in June 2001 the adoption of a specific text detailing 
the importance of insuring access to medicines. Additional pressure came from India and Brazil, 
two of the largest manufacturers of generic medicines.
9
 What began as a small paragraph grew to 
several pages before its eventual adoption by WTO member governments on November 14, 2001 





                                                 
5
 International Trade and Health: A Reference Guide. New Delhi: World Health Organization Regional Office for 
South-East Asia, 2009. 18 
6
 Lecture on TRIPS at Global Health Course at the Graduate Institute in Geneva. 14 April 2010. 
7
 International Trade and Health: A Reference Guide 14 
8
 Barnard, David. "In the High Court of South Africa, Case No. 4138/98: The Global Politics of Access to Low-Cost 
AIDS Drugs in Poor Countries." Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 12.2 (2002): 159-174. Project MUSE. 
<http://muse.jhu.edu/>. [Accessed 26 Mar. 2010].  
Spennemann, Christoph. Legal Expert, Intellectual Property Unit, Division on Investment and Enterprise, 
UNCTAD. Personal interview. 14 April 2010. 
9 Love, Roy. "Corporate wealth or public health? WTO/TRIPS flexibilities and access to HIV/AIDS antiretroviral 
drugs by developing countries." Development in Practice 17.2 (2007): 208-219. Academic Search Premier. EBSCO. 
Web. [Accessed 29 Mar. 2010]. See page 210 
10
 Velásquez, Germán. Personal interview. 13 April 2010. Director, WHO Secretariat on Public Health, Innovation 
and Intellectual Property. World Health Organization. Also see “TRIPS and pharmaceutical patents”. WTO Fact 
Sheet. September 2006. 
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Explanation and Effects of the Doha Declaration on Public Health 
At its core, the Doha Declaration and its passage are most significant because it 
recognized the gravity of public health problems in a trade-related document and forced the 




 One does not 
have to be an intellectual property expert to understanding the impact of the Doha Declaration, 
and while this paper does not attempt to simply duplicate already published analyses, it is crucial 
to understand several important terms of the TRIPS agreement and the Doha Declaration to 
understand how they have impacted the usage of newer medications such as second and third 
line anti retro viral drugs. 
 One of the key results of the Doha Declaration was the agreement that countries had the 
right to issue compulsory licenses. Compulsory licensing occurs when a country ignores the 
patent protection of a specific product and authorizes another company to produce the patented 
product. Interestingly, a public health emergency does not have to be present for a compulsory 
license to be issued, however TRIPS does require a country to make an effort to obtain a 
voluntary license before issuing a compulsory one. A compulsory license can be granted without 
first attempting to obtain a voluntary license if there is an urgent need for the product, if it is 




 The question that remained following the Doha Declaration was how countries that 
lacked domestic manufacturing capability, often developing or least developed countries (LDCs), 
could benefit from issuing compulsory licenses if there were no firms to receive them. Article 
31(f), of the original TRIPS agreement, a subject discussed in a wealth of academic literature, 
                                                 
11
 Lecture on TRIPS at Graduate Institute 
12
 Velásquez, Germán 
13
 International Trade and Health: A Reference Guide 81 and lecture at Graduate Institute 
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stated that any production arising out of a compulsory license had to be primarily for the 
domestic market. Paragraph 6 of the Declaration thus instructed the Council for TRIPS to “find 
an expeditious solution to this problem…before the end of 2002”.
14
 In August 30, 2003, the 
Decision of the General Council allowed countries unable to manufacture medicines on their 
own to import from another country as long as both issued compulsory licenses, thus allowing a 
system of parallel importation.
 15
 Explained above in the case of South Africa in 1999 and 2000, 
parallel importation is sometimes referred to as “grey imports” and gives the impression that it is 
of questionable legality (leaning towards the black market) despite the clarification provided by 
the Doha Declaration. Because Paragraph 6 is part of the Doha Declaration of 2001 and the 
General Council Statement on the Implementation of Paragraph 6 (referred to as both the “WTO 
waiver” and “Paragraph 6 solution”) occurred in 2003, the two are often grouped together in 
discussion of parallel imports. 
 
Legalizing Arbitrage 
 The Declaration and Paragraph 6 solution thus legalized a certain degree of arbitrage, the 
technical term for making a profit by buying a product at a low price in one country and selling it 
at a higher price in another country. However, regulatory controls established by TRIPS, the 
Doha Declaration, and the General Council Statement make parallel imports of pharmaceuticals 
different than the sorts of arbitrage that lead to major trade disputes because it only applies to 
countries that are unable to produce the medicines for themselves and forbids the sale of the 
medicines in any market other than the country of need and the country of supply.
16
 The 
                                                 
14
 Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health. Paragraph 6. 14 Nov. 2001. 
<http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min01_e/mindecl_trips_e.htm>. [Accessed 21 April 2010]. 
15
 Syam interview 
16
 “TRIPS and pharmaceutical patents”. WTO Fact Sheet. September 2006. 6 
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medicines are often marked differently and placed in special packaging to prevent illegal 
reselling in other countries.
17
 While concern for medicines ending up in the wrong hands had 
been an argument used by pharmaceutical companies against parallel imports, unique product 
labeling has proven to be simple way to insure that medicines sold at different prices for one 
country will not affect sales in another country.  
 
Effects of the 2003 General Council Decision on Paragraph 6 
The original thinking behind the 2003 General Council Decision was for Paragraph 6 of 
the Doha Declaration to become an official section of the TRIPS Agreement. While the 2003 
Waiver adopted Paragraph 6 as Article 31bis, it remains to be verified by the entire WTO, which 
has consistently pushed back the deadline for adoption, currently set to take place in 2011.  
While this is hardly in agreement with the “expeditious solution” prescribed by the TRIPS 
Agreement, the effect would simply be a formality at this point as the 2003 Waiver gave 




Paragraph 6 System and its one-time use – What does it mean and does it indicate success? 
Much of the debate over the Paragraph 6 system centers on the fact that it has only been 
implemented once, in a parallel import agreement between Canada and Rwanda in 2007. Canada 
announced in September 2003, one month after the WTO waiver, or Paragraph 6 solution, was 
approved.
19
 A Canadian generic pharmaceutical manufacturer, Apotex, agreed to manufacture 
and export to Rwanda a supply of fixed dose combinations (FDCs) of zidovidine, lamivudine, 
                                                 
17
 WTO spokesperson. Personal interview. 25 March 2010. 
18
 WTO spokesperson interview and Nyam interview 
19
 “Members ask: Is the ‘Par. 6’ system on intellectual property and health working?” WTO 2010 News Items. World 
Trade Organization, 2 March 2010. <http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news10_e/trip_02mar10_e.htm>. 
[Accessed 25 March 2010]. 




 Interestingly, the exchange was initiated by Canada and not by Rwanda, the 
country in need of the medicine. Apotex asked the Canadian health authorities for approval of 
their generic drug in December 2005, and did not select Rwanda is its country for export until 
July 2007.
21
 In a meeting on March 10, 2010, Canadian representatives presented their timeline 
of the project and pointed out obtaining the actual compulsory license only required two weeks. 
Responding to claims of an inefficient system, the Canadian delegation explained that it was 
eight months before Canadian legislation was adjusted to comply with the 2003 Waiver, one year 
for identifying a country for export, and two months between Apotex’s application for a 
voluntary license from three patent owners and it application for a compulsory license from the 
Canadian government. Including the Rwandan procurement process, the entire project lasted 




The Actual Goal of ‘Paragraph 6’ 
As was recently emphasized WTO Director-General Pascal Lamy, the goal of the 
Paragraph 6 system was not to issue compulsory licenses, but rather to help increase the 
availability of medicines at lower prices.
23
 In the past ten years the cost of medicines, including 
antiretroviral drugs that are used to treat HIV and AIDS, have decreased and the numbers of 
those receiving ARV treatment has skyrocketed. This has occurred for a variety of reasons, 
including the fact that organizations such as Medecins Sans Frontieres/Doctors Without Borders 
(MSF) and the Gates Foundation have found ways to purchase drugs at lower costs and because 
there has been an outpouring of AIDS relief efforts such as UN AIDS, the Global Fund and 
                                                 
20
 International Trade and Health: A Reference Guide 86 
21





 WTO interview 
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others that have been quite effective in increasing the amount of ARV treatment in African 
countries and throughout the world.  
 
Compulsory Licensing as a Negotiating Tool 
Compulsory licenses have served as an important bargaining chip for governments 
negotiating with pharmaceutical companies.
24
 While one cannot deny of course that the 
Paragraph 6 system has only been used once, experts agree that its use is by no means the best 
measure of whether access to drugs has increased.
25
 An economic principle known as the 
specificity rule states that the best way to deal with a policy problem is to correct it at the source. 
Thus if drug prices are to become lower there was must be a carrot or stick for pharmaceutical 
companies, and the stick can be the possibility of “legal sanctions”.
26
 Compulsory licenses act as 
the stick because the threat of one can be enough to convince a company to agree to a voluntary 
license. Patent owners often prefer issuing a voluntary license than dealing with a compulsory 
one because they can receive higher revenue from a license they negotiate than one issued by a 
local government.
27
 While countries issuing compulsory licenses are still obligated to pay 
“adequate compensation” to patent owners, the 2003 Waiver stated that payment only needed to 
be collected once in the exporting country and not in the importing country as well. 
28
 While the 
more developed exporting country may be able to pay more than the less developed importing 
country, there is no guarantee that a government and a patent owner will agree on what 
constitutes adequate compensation. 
 




 WTO spokesperson interview 
26
 Reichman 254 
27
 Syam and WTO spokesperson 
28
 Reichman 249 
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History, Theory and Reasoning Behind Pharmaceutical Patents 
 The parallel import system included in the 2003 decision had obvious benefits for the 
large generic producing countries such as Brazil, India, and China. 
29
  An additional impact of 
the 2003 Decision was the extension of deadlines for transitioning to the conditions outlined in 
the original TRIPS Agreement and the Doha Declaration. The original January 1, 2000 deadlines 
for developing countries to accept all of the TRIPS provisions, such as instituting both product 
and process patents, was extended to 2000 and the original 2006 deadline for least developed 
countries was extended to 2016.
30
  Included in the texts was the agreement that India would have 
until 2005 to adjust its patent laws to grant patents on products and not just on processes.
31
  
India’s patent laws historically did not recognize a new combination of chemical compounds as 
patent-worthy, meaning that if a pharmaceutical company reconfigured an already patented drug 
to be manufactured differently it would most likely not receive a patent in India.  
India has become known as “the pharmacy of the developing world”
32
 due to its well-
established generic drug industry, which can be traced back to the patent system the country 
inherited from Great Britain after gaining independence in 1947. At the time of the Paris 
                                                 
29
 Reichman 249 
30
 “Transition provisions”. Pharmaceutical patents and the TRIPS Agreement. Technical note. WTO. 21 Sept. 2006. 
<http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/pharma_ato186_e.htm>. [Accessed 21 April 2010]. Also see “TRIPS 
and pharmaceutical patents”. WTO Fact Sheet. September 2006. 5 
31
 Anonymous WTO expert. Phone interview. 22 April 2010. 
32
 von Schoen-Angerer, Tido. “India: Will Pharma, trade agreements shut down the Pharmacy of the Developing 
World?”. 19 April 2010. Editorial published on MSF Campaign for Access to Essential Medicines website and in 
Huffington Post. <http://www.msfaccess.org/main/access-patents/india-will-pharma-trade-agreements-shut-down-
the-pharmacy-of-the-developing-world/>. [Accessed 26 April 2010]. 
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Convention for the Protection of Intellectual Property in 1883, one of the earliest intellectual 
property agreements, many countries did not grant patent protection on pharmaceuticals.
33
  
In India, the Tex Chand committee in 1949 and the Ayyangar committee in 1957 decided to 
grant process patents on foodstuffs and medicines for only five years. The five year limit meant 
generic versions of medicines were developed more rapidly than in other countries.
34
 Today the 
lowest-priced drugs are found in India, despite adjustments that the country has had to adopt as a 
result of the TRIPS Agreement. Despite the fact that TRIPS did not define what is considered 
novel or inventive, it did require countries to grant patents on pharmaceuticals as products and 
ones that would last at least twenty years. India was allowed to have a ‘mailbox system’ for 
patent applications between 1995 and 2005, which meant countries were able to apply for 
product patents but the applications would not be examined until 2005. Even today there 
continue to be disputes in India over product patents.
35
 In 2007, Novartis brought a lawsuit in 
India over their leukemia drug Gleevec. Novartis had used a different formula that allowed the 
medicine to be absorbed in the bloodstream faster and claimed it was a new drug deserving a 
new patent, however the Indian patent office disagreed.
36
 While twenty years is a reasonable 
length of time for a patent, it is important to note that a twenty-year patent on a computer device 
has dramatically different effects than a twenty-year patent on a medicine.
37
 There are those who 
believe that a shorter patent duration could be beneficial in increasing access to medicines, but 




 Syam and “History of Indian Patent System”. <http://www.patentoffice.nic.in/ipr/PatentHistory.htm>. [Accessed 
23 April 2010]. 
35
 WTO lecture at Graduate Institute 
36
 “Novartis concerned Indian court ruling will discourage investments in innovation needed to bring better 
medicines to patients”. Media Releases – Novartis. 6 Aug. 2007. 
<http://cws.huginonline.com/N/134323/PR/200708/1144199_5_2.html>. [Accessed 24 April 2010]. 
37
 Dyer, Owen. “BMJ: New 20 year patents threaten to end AIDS drugs for developing countries”. MSF Article. 
Médecins Sans Frontières. 4 December 2004. 
<http://www.msf.org/msfinternational/invoke.cfm?component=article&objectid=ECEDF48F-9D6F-45DD-
AFCD7E55622F351B&method=full_html>. [Accessed 23 March 2010]. 
 Fuchs 14 
 
the countries in favor of this are in the minority and worry that any advocacy for shorter patent 




The Effect of Bilateral Trade Agreements 
Many of the flexibilities obtained through the Doha Declaration that are beneficial for 
developing countries are at risk of becoming diminished by new bilateral trade agreements.
39
 
While the strengthening of intellectual property rights through the TRIPS Agreement was 
beneficial to pharmaceutical companies, many were not pleased with the results of the Doha 
Declaration and the 2003 Wavier decision. Companies “persuaded the United States Trade 
Representative (USTR) to recapture lost ground by means of Bilateral or Regional Free Trade 
Agreements with developing countries.
40
 Because of WTO principles that forbid giving most 
favored nation status to any country, any conditions extended to one country by another could 
theory apply to the former country’s dealings with every WTO member.
41
 Scholar Jerome 
Reichman also claims that the pharmaceutical industry “flooded the world with misleading and 
self-serving interpretations of relevant legal instruments,” which is definitely not helpful in the 
realm of intellectual property where is confusing enough without the extra interpretations 
intended to skew decision making in one direction or another.  
 There are several views of how pharmaceutical companies have fared under TRIPS and 
Doha. They gained an increased recognition of intellectual property rights, but would have 
preferred if the 2003 clarification had not come about as it emphasized how the Doha 






 Reichman 249 
41
 Syam 
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Declaration can be used to the benefit of individual countries.
42
 There is one view that the 
companies “shot themselves in the foot” after the initial TRIPS Agreement considering 
cooperation has increased dramatically between the industry and the World Health Organization. 
Some of their initial complaints had reasonable merit, such as their fear of medicines destined for 
one country ending up in another country illegally, however this was easily resolved with 
different colored pills and special packaging. 
43
 All in all, the pharmaceutical industry emerged 
as the biggest winner from the TRIPS Agreement.
44
 Scholar Frederick M. Abbott concludes the 
“Patent pendulum is shifting in a major way in favor of Pharma interests”.
45
 Reichman writes 
that “developing countries lost the war” in losing the ability to easily reverse-engineer medicines 
to produce generics.
46
 However, many companies are still upset with then-USTR Robert Zoellick 
for in effect giving away too much because countries have the renewed power to issue 
compulsory licenses.
47
 It becomes difficult to analyze the effectiveness of this power because 
countries can succeed in negotiations by not issuing compulsory licenses. 
 
Pharmaceutical Industry’s Perspective 
From the perspective of the pharmaceutical industry, the TRIPS Agreement and Doha 
Declaration would not have occurred without the push from the AIDS crisis.
48
 While negotiators 
from developing countries preceding the Doha Declaration were very clear on not limiting the 
impact of any new agreement, there were efforts made by the United States to limit the 
                                                 
42
 Phone interview with an additional WTO expert 
43
 WTO spokesperson interview 
44
 Reichman 248 
45
 Abbott, Frederick M. “The WTO medicines decision : world pharmaceutical trade and the protection of public 
health”. American Journal of International Law. 99(2) Apr. 2005: p.317-358. LexisNexis Academic. 
<http://www.lexisnexis.com>. [Accessed 23 March 2010]. 
46
 Reichman 247-8 
47
 Lecture at Graduate Institute 
48
 Retired Merck executive. Personal interview. 29 March 2010. 
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applicability either by disease or geographic region. In February 2003, at a Tokyo mini-
ministerial meeting, USTR Robert Zoellick proposed limiting any solutions to Africa in 
exchange for allowing broad language on the “scope of diseases”.
49
 An article published in 
October 2001 in the Journal of the American Medical Association (JAMA) became fairly 
influential in pharmaceutical circles because it concluded that patents were not the main obstacle 
to treatment of HIV/AIDS in African countries. At the time of publication, authors Amir Attaran 
and Lee Gillespie-White found that of the fifteen anti-retroviral drugs (ARVs) in use, only 
thirteen patents existed in Africa, and eleven were in South Africa alone.
50
 While it is important 
to note that Attaran received a grant from Merck after the publication of his article,
51
 his findings 
are nonetheless still significant.  In the 1990s there were few if any patents on ARVs in India, the 
country of supply, and relatively few in African countries, the countries of use, which begs the 
question of why everyone looks immediately to the TRIPS Agreement.
52
 Even a current 
pharmaceutical executive agreed that for the most part the TRIPS Agreement is irrelevant to 
fighting AIDS in Africa.
53
 While executives make the important point that a comprehensive 
public health solution and not simply cheaper drugs is necessary to ameliorate the AIDS crisis, 
the fact that drugs have become cheaper in the past fifteen to twenty years has undoubtedly 




                                                 
49
 Abbot 8 
50
 Attaran, Amir, and Lee Gillespie-White. "Do Patents for Antiretroviral Drugs Constrain Access to Aids Treatment 
in Africa?" JAMA 286.15 (2001): 1886-92. 
51
 Attaran, as well as Velasquez interview 
52
 Interview with retired Merck executive 
53
 Pharmaceutical official specializing in International Aid. Personal interview. 16 April 2010. 
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Price Discrimination: Avoiding bad press and fulfilling a moral obligation 
While many pharmaceutical companies originally resented
54
 the Doha Declaration placing them 
in a position similar to that of a public health authority, they eventually realized it was in their 
interest to sell drugs at lower prices in poorer countries to both preserve their public image and 
fulfill a moral obligation. Pharmaceutical companies now use a variety of different prices 
depending on the specific market, however this was not always the case. Price discrimination is a 
key element of microeconomic theory,
55
 but at the same time there have been some specific 
cases where monopoly pricing was more beneficial to the companies involved. In addition, for 
many years pharmaceutical companies were hesitant to charge different prices for the same drugs 
out of fear that customers in wealthy countries would not tolerate it. Even today companies have 
to be careful because one cannot automatically “expect the rich to be generous” if they have to 
pay one thousand dollars for a medicine and others only have to pay one dollar.
56
 Fortunately for 
AIDS patients in developing countries, however, this line of thinking has not impeded their care 
because companies have found a common ground between economic incentives and moral 
obligations. 
 
Economic Arguments for Price-Discrimination: 
Jerome Reichman points out, “most economists would agree that in a perfect world” 
pharmaceutical companies would ‘avoid risk of compulsory licenses by pricing products close to 
the marginal cost of production so that poor people around the world could afford them’.
57
 
Reichman goes on to suggest that pricing based on per-capita gross domestic product (GDP) for 
                                                 
54
 Retired Merck executive 
55
 Basu, Sudip Ranjan. Economist, International Trade Division, UNCTAD. Personal interview. 14 April 2010. 
56
 Current pharmaceutical executive 
57
 Reichman 251 
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example, would be an objective way of determining price differences and “reduce the 
deadweight loss” created when only rich consumers purchase medicines.
58
 The unfortunate truth, 
however, is that from a purely economic standpoint there are many arguments for non-
discriminatory pricing of pharmaceuticals. Reichman analyses the economic analysis of several 
scholars on the subject, such as Aidan Hollis, Sean Flynn, and Micheal Palmedo, who have 
written about the “Problem of the Convex Demand Curve” for “essential goods in countries with 
large income disparities”. In these particular markets firms actually maximize their profits by 
‘setting a price unaffordable to at least ninety-percent of the people’.
59
 Hollis’ argument is based 
on data comparisons between South Africa, a country with a large income disparity, and 
Norway, a country with a high level of income equality.  
While breaking away from this logic can require companies to act against their own self-
interest, these same companies are in a unique line of work where their decisions have 
undeniable implications that can go as far as matters of life and death. Author James Love makes 
the blunt but accurate claim that even a minimal deadweight loss can lead to dead bodies.
60
  
Despite any economic arguments to the contrary, however, “pharmaceutical companies 
have to have discriminatory pricing” simply because it is the right thing to do. In the 1980s when 
the AIDS crisis first emerged a diagnosis was almost the same as a death sentence, because no 
treatments were available until nearly ten years later. AIDS has now become a livable disease, 
and “No one has ever been criticized for selling a pill at fifty cents a day in poor countries”.
 
 
While some companies feared that charging lower prices would be a “one-way corridor” to 
conciliatory pricing, when they finally implemented lower prices the sky did not fall and no one 




 Reichman 252, citing endnote #59 
60
 Ibid 
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asked for compulsory licenses on Viagra (at least not successfully).
 61
 In the end companies do 
not suffer tremendous monetary losses and in fact gain good publicity for appearing in touch 
with the reality of public health crises.  
 
Medical Ethics and Humanitarian Perspective 
 
 There are many who continue to see the TRIPS regime as an impediment and not an aid 
to increasing access to medicines in developing countries. There are criticisms of the Paragraph 6 
system as too complex for a developing country without any patent infrastructure.
62
 Professor 
Robert Bird points out there are 1.7 billion people in world without access to essential medicines 
and that there are potential “social costs” of compulsory licensing, such as a decrease in foreign 
direct investment.
63
 While it is true that a country’s intellectual property (IP) system can 
influence a company’s investment decisions, a more liberal IP system could actually encourage 
generic firms to invest even if it deters larger corporations.
64
 In general however, there has been 
no defined or proven relationship between intellectual property and foreign direct investment.
65
 
 Many pharmaceutical companies have aid programs where they either donate medicines 
or sell them at reduced prices to specific populations, and while these can sometimes be more for 
show than impact,
66
 they nonetheless remain an important way for patients to obtain patented 
medicines. This can be viewed as an extension or element of Corporate Social Responsibility 
(CSR), but at the same time it is also fulfilling the United Nations’ Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights.
 67
 Article 25, Section 1 states, “Everyone has the right to a standard of living 
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adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, 
housing and medical care…”.
68
 The backing of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights has 
been to the benefit of humanitarian organizations such as Medecins Sans Frontieres/Doctors 
Without Borders, which played a key role in lobbying for the Doha Declaration in the first place. 
However some believe that the MSF and others like it have taken matters too far in an effort to 
maintain the momentum generated by the TRIPS Agreement.
69
 The role of organizations such as 
MSF in the TRIPS/Doha debate has come into question recently with the March 2010 meeting at 
the WTO.
70
 While it is hard to argue that MSF’s “Campaign for Access to Medicines” is a bad 
thing, one must ask if developing countries deserve more than free or reduced-priced medicines 
but full-picture approach as well.
 71
  Pharmaceutical companies cannot, however, provide a 
complete public health solution, as that ability rests primarily with local health ministries.  
 The health needs of developing countries continues to be neglected in general simply 
because there is not a large market potential involved. Market-driven research and development 
is often not directed at diseases, such as Tuberculosis, that are generally found in poor 
populations.
72
 While the small market might make pharmaceutical companies more willing to 
sell drugs at lower prices, it also makes it difficult for local producers to emerge. Selling 
antiretroviral drugs is not the most profitable endeavor,
73
 which brings the matter back to the 
realm of charity or corporate social responsibility when it really should be in the realm of public 
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health. However, local health infrastructure is not always reliable in countries where even 
doctors and nurses, not to mention multitudes of others, have difficulty feeding their families. If 
the whole situation sounds more like an exercise in circular logic that is due the fact that in many 
cases policy proposals on the subject are an exercise in circular logic. This pattern only 
highlights the complexity of the matter and others like it where market forces conflict with 
ethical desires. 
 
TRIPS in Action: Thailand 
Other than the parallel imports between South Africa and Rwanda, the other primary 
country example is Thailand. In 2006 Thailand issued a government use compulsory license for 
Effavirenz, an important antiretroviral drug under patent at the time by US pharmaceutical 
company Merck.
74
 With the exception of “women of childbearing potential”, most adults can 
take Effavirenz in combination with other HIV/AIDS medicines and experience relatively few 
side effects that might otherwise impede treatment.
75
 Thailand decided it wanted to import 
generic versions of Effavirenz from India and eventually manufacture the generic domestically. 
Merck initially proposed a price that was twice that of the Indian generic, though they later 
lowered their price to twenty percent above the price in India. 
76
While the actions of Thai 
Government were completely legitimate under the TRIPS regime,
77
 the United States responded 
by placing Thailand on its “Special 301” list of countries violating intellectual property rights.  
The reprisal of the United States was not in concordance with international trade agreements, and 
                                                 
74
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the United States even lost a WTO ruling on the matter.
78
 In January 2007 Thailand issued 
additional compulsory licenses for Kaletra, an important second-line ARV, and Plavix, used to 
treat heart disease.
79
 In response Abbott Laboratories, a US firm, withdrew registration of 
Kaletra in Thailand prompting outrage by Médecins Sans Frontières.
80
 There were some 
accusations against the Thai government for making a profit with in producing the Efavirenz 
generic, however in reality any profits made were minimal at best and went back to the Thailand 




Alternatives to Compulsory Licenses 
There are a variety of policy proposals aimed at lowering the costs of medicines without 
using compulsory licenses. One can follow the Belgian model of avoiding Paragraph 6/Article 
31bis entirely and using Articles 8 and 30 of the TRIPS Agreement instead.
82
 Professor Kevin 
Outterson at Boston University School of Law has proposed a “buy out scheme” where 
medicines would be distributed free of patents in poor countries with monopoly pricing in OECD 
countries. 
83
 Buying in bulk, or pooled procurement strategies, could be very practical for 
treating patients in India because of the countries generic manufacturing capabilities.
84
 Price 
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discrimination tools can be included in medicine distribution programs.
85
 A movement that has 
grown among research universities in the United States in recent years is the group Universities 
Allied for Essential Medicines (UAEM), where universities conducting pharmaceutical research 
negotiate with companies to insure the benefits of their work reaches as many people as 
possible.
86
 Some have even suggested applying the Linux computer operating system open 





Conclusions – How does one evaluate success? 
In determining the success of any government or international policy depends largely on 
the questions used to evaluate it, and the TRIPS Agreement and the Doha Declaration are no 
exception. Jerome Reichman makes the important observation that there are many risks in 
comparing Thailand’s use of government compulsory licenses and Canada’s parallel import 
system with Rwanda. Since 2003, Cameroon, Ghana, Eritrea, Zambia, and Mozambique have 
issued compulsory licenses for various HIV/AIDS medicines.
88
 Whether or not this has benefited 
HIV/AIDS patients in these countries requires further examination of patent and import data that 
are beyond the scope of this paper. One can safely conclude, however, that at the very least the 
ability to impose compulsory licenses has allowed these countries to have more leverage in 
international negotiations. 
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In reflecting on his work in intellectual property with the World Health Organization, Dr 
Germán Velásquez admits that the WHO and other organizations were mistaken in emphasizing 
the powers of compulsory licenses.
89
 Jerome Reichman observes that “minimum standards of 
patent protection” have increased over time “in keeping with the expressed goals of the Paris 
Union [of 1883].” However, “every attempt to limit” compulsory licenses from the state has 
“invariably resulted” in an increase in power of compulsory licenses on the international level.
90
 
Thus, recognition of intellectual property rights has increased alongside compulsory licenses. 
Compulsory licenses have always been part of intellectual property law, but whether or not legal 
scholars intended them to reach their current level of power in global health is at minimum a 
debatable matter. There is no question that the situation of those with HIV/AIDS in developing 
countries has increased dramatically in the last ten years, but whether one can connect this to the 
Doha Declaration is unclear. If nothing else the subjects raised in the discussion of TRIPS and 
Doha are important reminders of the powers and responsibilities of both countries and 
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